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Abstract–This paper illuminates widening variety of 
technology assessment (TA) activities by parliamentary 
organizations and other bodies in the United States and Europe.  
It also illustrates a range of institutional options for TA from the 
view of its key elements, and examines the operational issues. 
Based on extensive interviews with TA practitioners and other 
related actors, we identified the recent direction of TA activities 
and provide discussion materials for states and regions in which 




Technology assessment (TA), symbolized as ‘early 
warning’ in its initial development stage, has been recognized 
that TA gives a warning against policymakers in the early 
stage of technological development by analyzing (particularly 
negative) societal impacts of future technology.  There have 
been increasingly a wider variety of TA activities since the 
birth of a parliamentary organization dedicated to TA in the 
United States in the 1970s, which was followed by the 
establishment of the subsequent TA organizations affiliated 
with various European parliaments, and the widening TA 
activities in other government agencies, NGOs and 
universities.  Such variety implies that the 
institutionalization of TA is now undergoing with different 
purposes in diverse political and social contexts.  This paper 
illuminates various TA activities undertaken mostly by TA 
organizations connected to parliaments in the United States 
and Europe.  It also illustrates a range of institutional options 
for TA from the view of its key elements, and examines the 
operational issues. 
Piled individual studies on the Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA), which was a parliamentary TA 
organization in the US, and some TA organizations affiliated 
with parliaments in Europe, have mainly targeted at activities 
around the turn of the century [1][2][3][4].  Among them, 
there are relatively few studies on TA experiences in the US 
and Europe from a comparative and comprehensive 
perspective [5][6].  Few and dispersed information is 
available for the movements in this century including various 
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TA activities in other government agencies, NGOs and 
universities.  Based on extensive interviews with TA 
practitioners and other related actors, we provide discussion 
materials for states and regions in which there is a growing 
concern about the institutionalization of TA functions. 
Key elements in the institutional arrangement of TA in our 
analysis include organizational affiliation (e.g. parliament, 
administrative agency, private sector), sponsor (e.g. 
parliament, administrative agency, private sector), member of 
the steering committee (e.g. parliamentarians, experts), 
implementing body (e.g. parliamentarians, internal staff, 
contractors), and addressee (e.g. parliament, administrative 
agency, the public).  Operational issues to be discussed 
include considerations in the introduction of TA institutions 
reflecting political and social contexts, TA methods, TA 
practitioners’ competence and training support for them. 
II. DIVERSITY OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
A. Organizational Affiliation 
There may be at least three types of the organizational 
affiliation for TA.  The first type is parliament.  Examples 
include OTA, the Parliamentary Office of Science and 
Technology (POST, UK), the Parliamentary Office for 
Evaluation of Scientific and Technological Options (OPECST, 
France), the Technology Assessment Bureau of the German 
Parliament (TAB), the Flemish Institute for Science and 
Technology Assessment (viWTA), and the Science and 
Technology Options Assessment (STOA, European 
Parliament).  In the states with bicameral legislature, TA 
organizations can be affiliated with either both houses or a 
single house.  The former applies to US, UK and France 
whereas the latter applies to Germany (TAB is set in the lower 
house).  In the case of UK, POST is affiliated with both 
houses, but the function of which has to be strategically 
differentiated from the Select Committee on Science and 
Technology in the House of Commons, that has historically 
played a certain role by deep analysis of scientific and 
technological issues.  This is one of the reasons why POST 
focuses on the publication of brief reports called POST Note. 
In setting a TA organization affiliated with parliament, there 
had been issues on bureaucratization of parliamentary 
organizations raised in some countries.  In the UK, at first, a 
TA organization was established outside the parliament, and it 
was then moved in the parliament after an experimental 
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period of a few years.  In Germany, the authority did not 
establish a new parliamentary organization but assigned a 
political management function to an existing parliamentary 
committee and commissioned the practical implementation to 
TAB as an external scientific expert organization.  In France, 
OPECST was installed not as a parliament committee but as a 
representative section of the parliament since the additional 
setting of a parliamentary committee was restricted. 
Distinguishing TA activities from the parliamentary library 
service is also an issue to be examined.  Considerable 
argument arose in US, UK and Germany, but as a 
consequence, the request for TA organization is to be limited 
to organizational request from committees and others, not 
personal request from individual parliamentarians and their 
staff, which could be undertaken by the parliamentary library. 
The second type is administrative body.  A good example 
is the Danish Board of Technology (DBT).  This agency was 
initially under the political authority of a parliamentary 
committee.  However, because the politically balanced 
perspective is expected in the Danish society and any 
parliamentary organizations are not permissible under the 
Constitution, DBT was finally set up in the Ministry of 
Research.  Many TA-like activities including foresight in the 
UK and the European Commission are undertaken in 
administrative agencies. 
The third type is functional setting in private sectors.  This 
type can be subdivided into five categories.  (1) Academy of 
Sciences such as the National Research Council (NRC) in the 
US, the Rathenau Institute in the Netherlands, the Center for 
Technology Assessment (TA-SWISS) in the Switzerland, and 
the Institute of Technology Assessment (ITA) in Austria.  In 
this case, institutional independence can be guaranteed to 
some extent, but because in some cases TA activities are 
evaluated in academic terms, the independence is to be 
counterbalanced by less direct influence toward the 
decision-making system.  (2) Public interest groups such as 
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in the 
US and the King Baudouin Foundation in Belgium.  (3) 
Universities, such as the Center for Nanotechnology in 
Society in Arizona State University (CNS-ASU).  (4) 
Advocacy groups, such as the International Center for 
Technology Assessment and other NGOs with specific 
interests.  (5) Collaboration between private firms and NGOs.  




The sponsor for TA closely corresponds to the 
organizational affiliation.  TA organizations set in the private 
sector have various financial resources.  In most of the case, 
governments provide some resources.  In the Netherlands, 
the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (OCW) is the 
sponsor for TA, and so are federal governments in 
Switzerland and Austria.  The U.S. 21st Century 
Nanotechnology R&D Act of 2003 stipulates the budget 
allocation for the implementation of TA, by which CNS-ASU 
has been conducting TA.  NRC in the US is also sponsored 
mainly by the federal government, but on the basis of 
individual contracts with government agencies.  NRC tries to 
guarantee independence by balancing resources from plural 
agencies [7].  Wilson Center in the US has one third of their 
fund coming from the Congress.  In most other TA activities, 
main sponsors are private firms and foundations. 
 
C. Member of the Steering Committee 
The steering committee plays a role in agenda setting and 
project management, except for OPECST, the steering 
committee of which does not set an agenda by its own.  
There can be three types of the steering committee. 
The first type consists of members of parliament (MPs) 
only.  OTA, OPECST, German parliamentary committee in 
charge of a management of TAB, and STOA are some 
examples.  In all these cases, the committee takes a 
reasonable balance between members from different parties 
and undertakes bipartisan management on a consensus basis.  
This makes it easy for them to commission a TA project 
faithfully reflecting parliamentary needs. 
The second type consists of MPs and external experts, as 
observed in POST and viWTA.  Some point out that this can 
make a good balance between politics and science. 
The third type consists of only external experts, as observed 
in the Rathenau Institute, DBT, TA-SWISS and ITA.  As to 
Rathenau, the members of committee are recommended by 
KNAW (Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences) 
and WRR (Scientific Council of Government Policy) and 
appointed by OCW.  For DBT, the chair and three 
individuals in the steering committee are selected and 
appointed by the Minister of Research, and the rest are 
recommended by designated organizations and appointed by 
the Ministry of Research [8].  TA-SWISS committee 
members are determined by the Swiss Science and 
Technology Council after the consultation between the 
Federal Ministry of Interior, the Federal Ministry of Economy 
and the director of TA-SWISS. 
 
D. Implementing body 
Our analysis identified four different types of TA 
implementing body. 
First, there are cases in which MPs undertake TA exercises 
by themselves, a typical example of which is OPECST.  It is 
of course in this case that they as practitioners know well user 
needs, i.e. their own needs.  The problem to be addressed is 
that committed members, who ought to have to a certain 
extent scientific and technological knowledge, are to be 
limited in number. 
Second, staff in TA organizations conducts TA and takes 
authorship of TA reports.  Examples include OTA, POST, 
Rathenau and ITA.  TA can suit MPs’ needs if the internal 
staff keeps in close touch with them. 
Third, external experts in the committee take authorship of 
TA reports.  In NRC, this kind of voluntary commitment 
might allow experts who take much time to attract others to 
their own views [7]. In the case of DBT, in cases where 
collaboration among actors are required, various experts and 
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stakeholders participating in the committees called cross 
disciplinary working groups, write report by themselves. In 
the case of consensus conference of DBT, participating 
citizens also write reports by themselves.  
Fourth, in STOA and TAB, TA implementation is 
contracted out to external organizations.  German parliament 
is outsourcing to TAB, an external scientific expert 
organization with the fear of the extension of parliamentary 
bureaucracy.  But the mechanism is designed to improve the 
communication between TAB staff and MPs as TA users, and 
at the same time the directorship of MPs against TAB as an 
external organization of parliamentary committee is 
guaranteed.  In addition, further outsourcing from TAB to 
other external organizations is restricted.  OTA in the US 
contracted out most studies to external bodies in its initial 
stage.  Such contractors, however, did not have much 
information about in what political and social contexts TA can 
be utilized in the actual policymaking.  This changed the TA 
process so that OTA staff conducts TA.  It seems that 




Major addressee of TA report can be divided into three 
categories. 
First, the addressee is parliament, as in the cases of OTA, 
POST, OPECST, and TAB.  Most of these parliamentary TA 
organizations target not individual MPs (as in the case of the 
Congressional Research Service in the US) but parliamentary 
organizations such as committees.  In the case that the main 
addressee is parliament, however, not only is parliament the 
substantive target in a narrow institutional sense.  OTA 
targeted not just parliament but rather issue networks as a 
collection of public and private experts on certain policy 
agenda [9]. 
Second, the addressee is administrative agency as in the 
early days of the Netherlands Office of Technology 
Assessment (NOTA).  NOTA then started reporting to the 
parliament as well.  Such official report to administrative 
agencies as well as parliament, as in the Dutch Health Council, 
can take place perhaps because of the Dutch own governance 
structure [6]. DBT of Denmark also reports both to parliament 
and various administrative agencies (not limited to the 
Ministry of Research where it is located). Likewise, 
TA-SWISS and ITA, each in the Academy of Sciences, give a 
report to federal government or administrative agencies as 
well as parliament.  NRC and similar agencies that undertake 
TA-like activities in the administration also have 
administrative agencies as the addressee. 
The third category of addressee is citizens and general 
public.  When reorganized in 1994, the Rathenau Institute 
added the promotion of public debate to their official aims.  
DBT and viWTA also aim to encourage public debate as well 
as the support for parliament.  TA-SWISS organizes 
deliberation forum involving the public for contentious issues.  
Interesting is that addressees for ITA include not only 
administrative and parliamentary bodies but also the National 
Union of Workers and the Austrian Economic and Social 
Council, as their social partners. 
III. OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
A. Eyes on the Political Structure and Culture: Different 
Attitudes toward “Independence” 
In designing a new TA institution, it is essential to keep 
eyes on the fact that different organizational features are 
needed for different political, social and cultural contexts in 
which TA organizations are embedded.  For instance, OTA, 
in the country with the separation of powers, has been 
functioned partly as an instrument for the Congress to control 
the administration.  From this perspective OTA is attached to 
the Congress, so that some are skeptical about the 
independence of OTA [1].  When Russell Peterson, the 
second director of OTA, attempted to encourage the 
independence of OTA from the Congress, he faced stiff 
opposition from the Congress and gave it up [10].  Basically, 
the affiliation with the Congress does not mean the 
attachment to specific major parties.  Bipartisanship remains 
in the consensual procedure of TA implementation.  The 
same applies to OPECST and STOA in essence.  POST and 
TAB, both in the countries with parliamentary cabinet system, 
also retain this kind of stance under the parliament. 
In the case of a TA organization under the Academy of 
Sciences, such as Rathenau, TA-SWISS and ITA, they intend 
to assure certain independence.  Such an organization does 
not invite the members of steering committee from the 
parliament although they may consult with related 
government agencies in terms of the appointment of 
committee members.  NRC also has a similar structure to 
this.  Affiliated with a university, CNS-ASU performs 
certain independence despite the financial dependence on the 
government. 
Somewhere in between the above two does DBT lay.  The 
Danish parliament took a lead for the establishment of DBT, 
but the parliament expected DBT to manage by their own 
staying at arm’s length and to keep politically balanced 
perspective.  The legislative restriction that it is forbidden to 
establish any parliamentary organization, also made DBT be 
placed in the administration.  Because its addressees include 
the parliament and the public and it keeps direct contacts with 
parliament and various administrative organizations, DBT is 
able to conduct independent operation from the administrative 
ministry where it is located. 
 
B. Process of the Introduction: the Utilization of 
Experiments and Events 
In the introduction processes of most European 
parliamentary TA organizations, the authority set up 
experimental periods and thereby determined the permanent 
institutionalization.  POST was established outside the 
parliament by a private fund in 1989, then accredited as a 
fixed-termed but official parliamentary organization in 1994, 
and eventually as permanent in 2001.  In Germany, a lower 
house resolution in 1989 conduced to the establishment of TA 
organization with a three-year term limit, followed by the 
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permanent institutionalization in 1993.  DBT also had a 
three-year term limit when established by law in 1985, 
underwent the twice extension of the term limit in 1988-89 
and 1989-95, and eventually came to a permanent 
organization by the 1995 law. 
In the political decision-making of such an introduction and 
establishment of TA organization, a social event provided a 
critical “window of opportunity”.  In Germany, the 
Chernobyl nuclear accident in the former Soviet Union 
allegedly made a substantial impact on the discussion about 
institutionalization of TA.  The permanent 
institutionalization of POST in the UK was greatly affected by 
the food crisis (as typified by the BSE case) since the late 
1990s. 
 
C. TA Methods: from Early Warning to Participation 
Early warning, which had originally expected as a TA 
function at the time of inauguration of OTA, had to be 
abandoned soon after the beginning of its operation.  As 
known as Collingridge Dilemma, impacts cannot easily be 
predicted until the technology is extensively developed and 
widely used.  But on the other hand, control or change is 
difficult when the technology has become entrenched [11][6].  
As a result, OTA shifted its focus on early warning to 
“thorough, objective information and analysis to help 
Members of Congress understand and plan for the short- and 
long-term consequences of the applications of technology, 
broadly defined”, and identified its own work as “a specific 
form of policy analysis” [10].  Later, practitioners in the 
European parliamentary TA organizations shared a common 
view on the difficulty with early warning.  This facilitated 
the dissemination of idea on constructive TA (CTA), 
particularly in the Netherlands, which aims to assess and 
intervene the ongoing process of technological development 
in a consistent way [6].  Also in Germany, TA meant an 
examination and review of obstacles and options for new 
scientific and technological developments by identifying and 
analyzing the social, economic, and ecological opportunities 
associated with them [12].  In brief, there has never been 
sheer early warning function institutionally performed in the 
operation of TA, whether in the US or in Europe. 
For the while, TA exercises have utilized in most cases 
participatory processes in whatever form.  Given the pivotal 
role of advisory committee that involves major stakeholders 
and experts in the operation of OTA, the formation of a shared 
perception among committee members was one of key TA 
functions.  This may mean that there is a certain 
commonality in the operational OTA and Rathenau and DBT, 
which explicitly introduced a participatory TA process.  
Every TA exercise does not entail participatory process, 
however.  OPECST was once forced to conduct a consensus 
conference, but being skeptical about the participatory process, 
it persists that TA should be conducted by MPs, as legitimate 
representatives of the public.  TA-SWISS under the 
Academy of Sciences undertakes both participatory and 
expert committee-based TA.  NRC activities are based on 
expert committees.  As to Germany, one pointed out that 
participatory TA does not fit German political culture.  
Participatory TA exercises are in effect various in terms of 
participants ranging from stakeholders only (US) to 
participants including the public (NL, DK), and in terms of 
the goal – whether consensus-oriented among the participants 
(DK) or not (US, NL). 
 
D. TA Practitioners’ Competence and Educational Support 
for Them 
First of all, it is necessary for TA practitioners to have a 
competence not only to analyze the issue concerned but also 
to organize the relevant community.  Analytical ability has to 
be trans-disciplinary to examine the interaction between 
interlinked issues.  Organizational capability can be 
paraphrased by an ability to communicate with policymakers, 
which may employ a special technique [13]; or in other words, 
a capability to form a network with NGOs and public 
officials. 
Then, how people can develop such a competence? An 
interesting exercise is the AAAS (American Association for 
the Advancement of Science) Science & Technology Policy 
Fellowship, by which approximately 30 junior science and 
engineering professionals serve in the Congress [13]. But 
there can be a doubt whether this kind of capability can be 
obtained afterwards. A director said that when interviewing 
candidates for staff, personality rather than educational 
background is focused.  
It is also good to keep the balance of backgrounds to 
facilitate interdisciplinary perspective. In the case of ITA, 
internal staff’s academic background is balanced between 
natural science and social and human science.  Rathenau 
Institute does not expect much science and technology studies 
(STS) as a practical research field, but rather as a reservoir of 
young talents in recruiting staff. 
 
E. Quality control 
In institutionalizing TA, it is important to provide 
well-balanced TA output reports and to assure the quality.  In 
POST, all the reports are peer-reviewed by the steering 
committee and reviewed by external experts before the 
publication.  In OTA, a project team or a senior management 
selects external experts and asks them for review.  NRC, by 
contrast, following an academic protocol, asks external 
experts for independent anonymous review [7].  There may 
be a matter of discussion on whether an academic review 
procedure in the Academy of Sciences is appropriate where 
reviewers may not be able to comprehend the political 
backdrop of a TA report.  Established in the Academy of 
Sciences, the Rathenau Institute does not apply this procedure.  
In this sense, it seems different from TA-SWISS. 
Important also is intra-organizational quality control.  
STOA’s assessment reports in the 1990s required the 
establishment of an external advisory panel, the utilization of 
independent external experts, internal reviews by at least three 
reviewers, and the employment of a full-time editor [6].  ITA 
organizes in-house seminars and internal reviews involving 
those who are not in the project group.  In the case of DBT, 
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open workshops involving divers actors are held after the 
framing of questions are formulated and draft reports 
sometimes without conclusion are prepared. In addition to this 
review process after drafting a TA report, the selection 
procedure of experts and the time management are also 
crucial in the quality control. 
In the operation of OTA, some pointed out that the fact that 
the Congress is the user plays a great role in the quality 
assurance of TA reports.  For this renowned experts and 
stakeholders had an incentive to commit to TA on the one 
hand and the Congress requested high quality of the products 
on the other hand [2].  In the case of OPECST, members of 
which are rapporteurs and authors of TA reports, there is 
variability in the quality of reports between the individual 
practitioners. 
IV. DISCUSSION – TOWARD THIRD GENERATION OF TA? 
In this final chapter we discuss the historical phase of 
modern TA, and the necessity of collaboration between 
TA(-like) activities. 
This paper has been focusing on the diversity of TA 
institutional arrangements in various countries with their 
operational issues so far.  Here we would like to take another 
analytical standpoint focusing on the change of institutional 
arrangement over time.  In this respect, discussions can be 
made on the paradigm shift from US parliamentary TA in the 
1970s as the first generation, to participatory and constructive 
TA employing explicit communication methods in Europe in 
the 1980-90s as the second generation.  In this vein, a further 
discussion point is whether there is any sign of the third 
generation observable at the moment. 
A recent noteworthy movement is the rise of private-based 
TA, such as CNS-ASU and King Baudouin Foundation.  
Constructive TA, originate in the Netherlands, has extended 
its activities from those related to parliament to those 
collaborating with a wide range of on-site stakeholders in 
assessing technology and introducing it to the society.  As in 
the case of the Environmental Defense - DuPont Nano 
Partnership Program, fascinating collaborations between 
advanced firms and NGOs become popular. 
One feature of these activities is demonstrating a potential 
of interactive TA without governmental intervention.  Given 
a co-evolution of technology and society in the modern 
context, this may indicate the possibility of actors’ 
autonomous learning through the interaction between 
technology and society bypassing the government.  Yet in 
some of these cases like CNS-ASU and several Dutch 
constructive TA exercises, it is to be noted that such activities 
are still maintained by government-related financial 
resources. 
As described thus far, there are various TA and TA-like 
activities undertaken by parliamentary, administrative and 
private bodies in individual countries.  There are also 
subdivisions within TA, such as medical technology 
assessment (MTA).  ITA internally had a small group 
dedicated to MTA, which has recently become independent 
with a support from external foundations.  In the UK, the 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) was 
established under the Ministry of Health as a MTA 
organization with the societal background of allocation 
problem in the National Health Service (NHS).  NICE 
assesses medical technology involving stakeholders such as 
industries and patient groups.  Future critical issues may 
concern how divergent TA and TA-like activities collaborate 
each other.  In effect, in France there is a lack of 
collaboration between parliamentary TA and other TA-like 
exercises in administrative agencies. 
It may also be necessary for TA to collaborate with other 
related activities.  TA, as evidenced by its name, is in a 
narrow sense an activity undertaken at the stage that the 
technology issued becomes tangible at some level.  Risk 
communication can be put into this category.  On the other 
hand, there is a case in which scenario analysis to envision 
trends of the society as a whole serves at the deliberation on 
policymaking and decision-making of individual technologies.  
Taking as an example the discussion on transition 
management in the Netherlands, it seems an endeavor to deal 
with issues for TA in a wider framework of the decision and 
steering of the direction of society, which is based on the 
accumulated evidences and experiences from constructive TA 
exercises.  This leaves future critical issues on how we 
manage, in the whole policy process, combination among 
various policy analytical tools – risk communication, scenario 
analysis, and problem structuring as well as TA. 
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